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ABSTRACT 
Scholarship on the impact of visits by the president of the United States on 
midterm gubernatorial elections is limited. This paper will examine the effects of such 
visits by the president of the United States on midterm gubernatorial elections. Cohen, 
Kreassa, and Hamman (1991) analyzed the impact of presidential visits on senate races 
and discovered these visits are strategic; also, when the president gets involved in an 
election, the president has a positive impact. I also believe that when different visits are 
split out different types of visits will have different effects. This is based on the time 
commitment of the president as the more time spent on a visit the greater the impact the 
visit should be. Using an original dataset, I evaluate how visits by the president effect 
vote share; this is as I seek to adapt some of the findings of the strategic calculations of 
the president to determine the impact of those visits by the president. My analysis shows 
that presidential visits have a positive effect on the vote share of the midterm 
gubernatorial candidates. In addition, I find that rally visits have the most consistent 
positive impact on candidates over the other types of visits analyzed in this study. Finally, 
when analyzing the interaction between visits and partisanship, the impact of a visit has 
variation dependent on the partisan composition of a state. 
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INTRODUCTION 
How does a president affect a candidate of their party in a midterm election? This 
question is discussed with great frequency following every midterm election. Pundits 
discuss the effect of whether a candidate embraced the president or if that same candidate 
adopted the correct strategy in distancing their campaign from the president. This is 
particularly true with candidates of the president’s party when deciding whether to 
receive a visit from the president or whether to distance themselves from the president.  
For example, following the 2014 elections, this question of whether a candidate 
should have campaigned with the president was once again asked after a historic election 
for the Republicans. This is particularly true with Governorships as Republicans were 
able to pick up many states that President Obama won in the previous two general 
elections. However, one notable exception in this Republican wave election was in 
Pennsylvania where the incumbent Republican governor lost his seat to the Democratic 
challenger Tom Wolf in that midterm gubernatorial election. This is even more notable as 
it was the first time an incumbent governor running for re-election had been defeated in 
Pennsylvania. Another reason that Wolf is a notable exception is because Democrats such 
as Mark Pryor, Mary Landrieu, Mark Udall, Kay Hagan, and Mary Burke went out of 
their way to distance themselves and even avoid visits from President Obama. Tom Wolf 
did not adopt this approach. Rather Wolf’s campaign embraced the president and actively 
campaigned with him. So much so that the president even gave remarks at a rally for 
Tom Wolf the day prior to the election. The goal of the visit by the president was to drive 
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up election turnout in key areas for the Wolf campaign (Field, 2014). The result seemed 
to positively affect Wolf as he cruised to a nine-point victory over the incumbent. This is 
just one example of how a visit by the president can influence a midterm gubernatorial 
election. The question then becomes is this impact similar to the impact a presidential 
visit has in general or is it nothing more than an exception? 
In scholarly research, the effect that a president has on gubernatorial elections has 
only been addressed in passing. This is because current scholarship does not directly 
examine this phenomenon but rather looks at the strategic motivation behind whether a 
president campaigns for fellow members of his party. One of the reasons why 
gubernatorial candidates and elections need to be studied is that states and governors 
matter. (Squire and Moncrief 2013) States matter because on issues such as taxes and 
social services, the state has the power to change many things, which could drastically 
alter a person’s daily life. Knowing what factors might influence the election of the state 
executive office is particularly important because they have the ability to sign or veto 
laws. This is increasingly true, as the gridlock within Congress has strengthened the 
ability and necessity of states to write the laws and solve problems. In addition, a large 
number of states have unified government, which makes the process of passing 
legislation easier. Another reason for this research is that it will directly address the effect 
that a national figure such as the president can have on a statewide election of a 
gubernatorial candidate that might impact the direction of policy. 
 Most of the attention given to the nature of presidential visits and midterm 
gubernatorial elections has focused on the strategic calculations of a president in deciding 
where to visit. Cohen, Krassa, and Hamman (1991) analyzed Senate elections and found 
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two things. They first find that the president is strategic, meaning the president appears to 
carefully choose where to visit in relation to the goals they seek to achieve. The second 
finding is that visits have a positive impact on senate elections meaning that presidents 
improve the ability of the members of their party to be elected. Based upon this finding, 
two future paths of research were constructed, with one focusing on the strategic 
calculation of the president and another focusing on the impact that a visit by the 
president has. Yet since the 1991 publication by Cohen et al., research has focused on the 
strategic calculation of presidents. This has left a tremendous gap in scholarship and as a 
result, we do not understand how presidential visits impact elections. This gap needs to 
be addressed in order to more fully understand if visits do actually matter or if a president 
is potentially wasting their time. I fill this gap in the literature by testing visits by the 
president and their impact on midterm gubernatorial elections. I then further examine 
whether different types of visits have different impacts and how the partisanship of a state 
affects the impact of a visit. 
Building upon the foundation of previous literature, I have my own theoretical 
expectations. I expect that presidential visits should have a positive impact on the 
elections. However, not only do I expect a visit to have a positive impact, I also expect 
that different types of visits will have different types of positive impact. Then based on 
the theory of time commitment, which is a version of the cost-benefit analysis, I am able 
to argue which type of visit should have the largest impact. Through which I argue that 
rally visits should have the largest impact of the types of visits examined when visits are 
separated out. This is because a rally visit has the largest time commitment for a president 
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signifying it should also have the largest payoff for the president and candidate 
represented in my results.   
In my analysis, I use data from nine election cycles from 1982 to 2014, only 
analyzing midterm election years to ensure comparability across elections. The dependent 
variable I use is vote share of the gubernatorial candidate from the president’s party. The 
main independent variable that I use in my first model is total visits. I define total visits 
as the summation of all the types of visits. Using total visits, I test my first hypothesis 
that a presidential visit should positively impact a candidate’s midterm gubernatorial 
election of the president's party. My main independent variables in my second model are 
rally, fundraiser, and other visits. I use those variables to test my second hypothesis, 
which is different types of visits by the president should have varying impacts on a 
candidate’s midterm gubernatorial election. My control variables include partisan 
affiliation, the unemployment rate, median income, Electoral College votes in the 
previous election, presidential approval, and the number of years the president’s party has 
controlled the White House.  
The results of my analysis demonstrate a few different things. First, total visits 
have a consistently statistically significant relationship with vote share at a rather high 
confidence level. This means that presidential visits increase the vote share received by a 
midterm gubernatorial candidate. Second, when distinguishing among types of visits, the 
results change.  Rally visits are much more similar to total visits. Rally visits like total 
visits are always statistically significant. Third, adding an interaction between visits and 
partisanship, demonstrates the impact of a visit varies dependent upon on the partisan 
makeup of a state. Meaning the impact of a visit to one state will not be the same as 
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another state.  Fourth, some control variables seem to have more significance than others 
do. The two control variables I find to be the most significant include whether the 
president won Electoral College votes in the previous election and the national approval 
of the president in September of the midterm election year. 
The remainder of this thesis contains the following. First, a literature review in 
which I examine academic work that is related to my research question. This shows what 
the evolution of work in this research field is and how my work will further prior research 
as well as influence the continuation of research in the future. I then move to a theory 
section in which I provide my expectations for my findings, particularly how I expect my 
main independent variable to explain variation in my dependent variable. Following my 
theory section, I will describe the data and methodology I used to examine my theory in 
an effort to discover if I am able to reject the null hypothesis. After presenting my data 
and methods, I summarize the key findings. I then conclude my paper by drawing further 
conclusions as well as list implications and discuss directions for future research. 
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EXISTING LITERATURE 
The role of presidential visits in state-level elections is addressed in existing 
political science debates. Previous research on the effect that a president has on a 
gubernatorial election began with Simon (1989). Simon examined gubernatorial elections 
to see if they demonstrate a relationship between the approval of the president and votes 
cast in gubernatorial elections. He demonstrates that citizen evaluation of presidential 
performance has an influence on voting behavior in gubernatorial elections because 
electoral accountability of the president is imposed through voting on gubernatorial 
candidates from his party because of that party relationship. The key finding of the 
analysis is that an evaluation of the presidents has a significant influence on the voting 
behaviors in gubernatorial elections when controlling for factors such as party affiliation 
of the incumbent governor.  
Cohen, Krassa, and Hamman (1991) build upon Simon and this relationship by 
looking at past approval and examining visits by presidents. They examined the 
determinates and consequences of presidents campaigning in midterm Senate elections. 
They argued that presidential campaigning is strategically based on presidential 
popularity and the competitiveness of the electoral race meaning that a president looks to 
visit areas with competitive elections where they also have their highest approval. This is 
because the president’s time is valuable and they want to use that time to most benefit the 
most candidates. This is why the president is strategic when determining which elections 
to visit. By strategic calculation, they discuss that a president attempts to “campaign 
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where their impact might make the most difference and when they are in the greatest 
need of congressional support” (Cohen, Krassa, and Hamman 1991, 169). This signifies 
that the strategic calculation of a presidential visit is used to describe the considerations, 
which can lead to the president making the greatest difference. 
Based on this logic, Cohen et al. sought to explain why a president campaigned in 
any given midterm senate election. They define campaigning as whether the president 
made an appearance with the Senate candidate in that candidate’s state. In their research, 
they focus upon the competitiveness of the elections, presidential popularity, and the 
percentage of legislative losses last election through which they make two key 
discoveries. Their first discovery confirms their expectation that campaigning by the 
president is strategic, meaning presidents strategically decide when, where, and for whom 
to campaign (Cohen, Krassa, and Hamman 1991). The second finding is that when the 
president does get involved in an election, the visits the president makes has a positive 
impact on the candidate (Cohen, Krassa, and Hamman 1991). These findings lead to two 
tracks in the trajectory of future research when looking at the visits by the president. 
From this point, future research could have looked at the strategic calculations of a 
president to visit a certain election or second it could look more into the impact of a 
president’s visit on that election.  
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Figure 1 Summary Table of the evolution of Scholarship 
Simon 1989:
Evaluations of the president has an impact 
on gubernatorial votes.
Cohen, Kreassa, and Hamman 1991: 
Presidential campaigning is strategic and has 
a positive impact on senate elections.
Research on the strategic calculation of 
where a President visits
Routh and Hoddie 2004:
Visits by the president is based on a 
Strategic calculation designed to 
maximize their partys electoral gains.
Sellers and Denton 2006:
The president makes more official visits 
then campaigns visits.
Eshbaugh-Soha and Nichlson-Crotty 
2009: 
A consideration of whether to visit a state 
is the presidents own electoral ambitions.
Lang, Rottinghaus, and Peters 2011:
Different considerations by the president 
lead to different types of visits.
Doherty 2012: 
The main purpose of visits  by a president 
is to strengthen his own electoral ablity.
Research on Impacts of a visit by 
President
My Thesis
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In the years since Cohen et al., the focus of the research has been on the strategic 
calculations of a president to visit certain candidates and campaigns. Routh and Hoddie 
(2004) narrow the discussion by looking only at the strategic calculation. They seek to 
further understand what factors influence a president’s decision to visit a particular state 
specifically during the midterm election for governors and members of Congress. Routh 
and Hoddie look at the strategic calculation of the president based on things such as the 
degree of party polarization in Congress, presidential scandals, the approval rating of the 
president, and the distance of the state from Washington D.C. They find that the midterm 
election behavior of a president is based on a strategic calculation designed to maximize 
his gains in congress and in governorships by focusing visits primarily on competitive 
campaigns. This finding that presidents travel to states where they have higher popularity 
and where there are a higher number of competitive seats demonstrate a potential focus of 
the president on committee or group visits which could allow the most amount of good in 
the least amount of time.  
Sellers and Denton (2006) further narrow the discussion as they seek to determine 
how collective concerns about party interests and individual concerns about electoral 
fortunes lead presidents to visit states leading up to the midterm elections. This is done by 
making a simple distinction between official and campaign visits both of which the 
president make with frequency. Based on this analysis, they find that presidents serving 
between 1982 and 2002 made more official visits than campaign visits and the frequency 
of each type of visit is dependent upon a range of state and national factors. One of these 
factors they found is that presidents tend to visit states with more electoral votes, which 
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demonstrates that a consideration of the president might be their own future electoral 
ambitions. 
This distinction in different types of visits leads Lang, Rottinghaus, and Peters 
(2011) to a different and more detailed division of the types of presidential visits. Lang et 
al. argue that understanding the type of visit and what the president does on that visit 
allows for a deeper exploration of presidential motivation. The differentiation between 
types of visits is more complicated than the differentiation made by Sellers and Denton. 
The types of visits that they identify include rally, fundraiser, and virtual visits. Rally 
visits are when there is an event where the president speaks to a crowd with the purpose 
of rallying supporters or encouraging citizens to vote. Fundraiser visits are visits where 
the president’s primary objective is to raise money for a candidate or candidates. Virtual 
campaigning is where the president did not physically visit a location but had a live or 
taped message for a group. They conclude that when aggregating visits together, 
Electoral College votes and the previous state-level winning percentage of the president 
in the state affect the probability of a visit. However, when looking at the different types 
of visits, rally visits are used more often when presidents are more popular and when the 
number of competitive races in a state is greater. Presidents are more likely to host a 
fundraiser in a state when the number of Electoral College votes is higher but are less 
likely to visit when there are fewer competitive races.  
Eshbaugh-Soha and Nichlson-Crotty (2009) build upon previous research by 
examining how the strategic calculation of the president to help candidates from their 
party relates to their own electoral ambitions. Eshbaugh-Soha et al. examine specifically 
mid-term elections to see if the president is more concerned with improving their party’s 
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candidates or with their own electoral ambitions. They argue that presidents have 
multiple goals when they campaign in midterm elections, seeking not only to influence 
individual races and affect the composition of Congress but also to increase their own 
chances for reelection. The research found that the likelihood of visiting a state is based 
on many factors. One example is that presidents tend to travel more to states with 
vulnerable statewide offices and competitive House elections in order to help the 
electoral fortunes of his party. Although a contributing factor to the likelihood of visiting 
a state is based on their own electoral ambitions. This idea of presidential concern about 
their own electoral ambitions is often referred to as the permanent campaign. 
The permanent campaign is based on the belief that rather than the president’s 
primary concern with visits being to help the parties’ candidates the primary role of visits 
could be to further the president’s own electoral hopes. Doherty (2012) built upon the 
concept of the permanent campaign (Caddell 1976, Blumenthal 1980, and Tepas 2000) as 
he looks to see what extent do presidents respond to electoral initiatives throughout their 
terms in office. He argues that the president’s efforts in visiting other candidates are 
related to their own personal electoral concerns and how that affects the ways, in which 
decisions are made in the White House. The theory behind it being that the president 
makes strategic choices, which in turn reveal their priorities as president. The analysis 
concludes that the strategies and efforts of the president are often to strengthen his hand. 
However, the president’s strategies to strengthen his hand also can undermine his role as 
a unifying national leader, heighten public cynicism, and limit prospects for bipartisan 
compromise.  
12 
 
In a departure from the others, Mellen and Searles (2013) look to see if some of 
the same factors that lead to a visit at the state level also apply to the district level. The 
authors argue that much of the existing research explains why presidents devote their 
limited resources during a midterm election but do not attempt to explain a presidential 
visit to a particular congressional district. The factors they look at include the amount of 
competitive districts in a state, district popularity, open seats, and other types of 
competitive elections in close proximities such as senate and gubernatorial elections. 
Their findings suggest that although presidents do indeed behave rationally when they 
make appearances for their co-partisans, visits are more likely to occur when there are 
multiple higher-level competitive races in a district, and presidents are more likely to go 
where they are already popular (Mellen and Searles 2013).  
All of the research that I discussed has painted a clear picture of the evolution of 
research related to presidential visits. This line of study about visits by the president was 
begun with the research of Cohen et al. as they examined presidential visits and midterm 
senate election. They demonstrate how the president is strategic and that visits have a 
positive impact. However as demonstrated in this literature review and as visually 
demonstrated in Table 1, all of the subsequent research has been related to the first 
finding of Cohen et al. about the president being strategic with their visits. The research 
on presidential visits has focused on the strategic calculation of where the president visits, 
in so doing it has left research on the impact of those visits back in 1991. 
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THEORETICAL ARGUMENT 
The concept of impact is fundamental to this project as I seek to understand the 
impact of a visit by the president on a midterm gubernatorial election. An impact is the 
ability of the president to harm or help the ability of the members of their party to be 
elected. Specifically, I seek to understand the impact of a visit by the president on the 
candidate of the president’s party in a midterm gubernatorial election. Impacts are 
important to understand because they are the consequence felt by an action. Both actors, 
the gubernatorial candidate, and the president feel the consequence based on the impact 
of a visit. It is felt by the candidates because either the impact is positive and increases 
their chances of being elected governor or the impact is negative and decreases their 
chances of being elected governor. The president feels the impact of a visit in two ways. 
First, the president either helps or harms their party electorally, particularly in that state in 
which they visit. The second consequence felt by the president is based upon self-interest, 
especially in the current era of partisan divide as governors of states of the opposition 
party challenge much of what a president does.  
This has been seen during the Obama administration as Republican governors 
have challenged all sorts of things. Examples are the Affordable Healthcare Act, the 
Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals executive order, and even the president’s stance 
on Syrian refugees. Impacts are important to understand in two different ways. Thus, the 
consequence felt by the president on how much opposition is received by these governors 
is dependent upon on how many are elected or reelected. An impact can be measured in 
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two separate but important ways first statistical significance shows whether the impact, in 
fact, matters and at what level it matters. Second to see if there is an economic impact of 
visits, meaning to what degree visits provide a benefit or impairment to those candidates 
that president’s visit. Thus, I seek to examine the impact presidential visits have on the 
midterm gubernatorial elections. 
I expect that a visit by a president should have a positive impact on those 
elections that the president chooses to participate in. I have this expectation because if 
campaigning had a negative or no impact then over time it would have lead presidents 
away from it and instead to find another use of their time. As the president has only a 
finite amount time in the position, the president tries to use their time in the way that will 
most benefit their goals. This is also illustrated in the strategic calculation by a president 
of where to visit. Since the president spends time on this consideration as demonstrated in 
previous research, if the visit was not beneficial, it seems that the president would stop 
these visits in an effort to find a way to promote their agenda. I also argue this 
expectation as previous literature has found that visits positively impact elections such as 
Cohen et al. found with Senate elections.  
For these reasons, I expect in general that a visit should have a positive effect on 
behalf of candidates. I expect a presidential visit to have a positive effect because 
presidential visits increase turnout. This is because presidential visits should typically 
result in a higher vote share for gubernatorial candidates of their party by helping 
reestablish the enthusiasm among their key constituencies who got them elected to turn 
out to vote for the candidate that they are visiting.  For example, as discussed previously, 
Tom Wolf received visits in the 2014 midterm elections from President Obama so that he 
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could help increase the enthusiasm among African-American voters in key urban areas to 
vote. This phenomenon should be particularly helpful to a candidate in the midterm 
election cycle. This is as midterm elections typically have a lower participation rate than 
the general election cycle so this increase among their key constituencies should have an 
even larger effect in a midterm gubernatorial election. 
Hypothesis 1: A presidential visit should positively impact a candidate’s midterm 
gubernatorial election. 
As pointed out in previous research, there are many different types of visits and 
many different ways to categorize visits. This is important to recognize because since not 
all visits are the same, it is clear that the impact of each type of presidential visit might 
also vary. For example, Sellers and Denton (2006) separate visits into two categories, 
which are official visits and campaign visits. They consider official visits to be visits that 
are non-campaign visits that are being used to strengthen the president’s own electoral 
support in states. Campaign visits are considered visits being used to boost the candidate 
of the president’s party. 
Related to Sellers and Denton, another work that also separated out visit types is 
Lang, Rottinghaus, and Peters (2011) who have a more complicated and intricate visit 
structure. The identified visit types include rally, fundraiser, and virtual. Rally visits are 
an event where the president speaks to a crowd with the purpose of rallying supporters or 
encouraging citizens to vote. Fundraiser visits are visits that the president’s primary 
objective is to raise money for a candidate or candidates. While virtual campaigning is 
when the president did not physically visit a location, but had a live or taped message for 
a group. However, these are just a few of the ways that visits can be categorized.  
16 
 
I argue using a similar visit structure involving rally visits, fundraiser visit, and 
other visits. I argue that each visit type has a different impact, like each type of visit, has 
a different and unique predictor of when that visit type would occur. As with my first 
hypothesis, I argue that visits have a significant and positive impact, although I argue that 
different types of visits should have different degrees of impact. I argue that these 
different degrees of impact of visits can be seen through the application of the theory of 
time commitment by the president. Through this theory, I am able to distinguish the 
theoretical expectations of why some types of visits should be more impactful than other 
types of visits. 
Lang, Rottinghaus, and Peters describe the theory of time commitment by the 
president as they use it to distinguish between their dependent variables in hopes to see 
where presidents are more likely to visit. I argue that the theory of time commitment by 
the president allows for a theoretical distinguishing between the main independent 
variables to see what type of visit gives the largest impact for a candidate. According to 
the theory of time commitment by the president, rally visits are the most time-consuming 
event for a president and as a result, they should have the highest degree of payoff for a 
candidate. Next fundraisers require less presidential time, planning, and coordination than 
a rally and should have the second highest degree of payoff. Finally, virtual visits have an 
even lower time commitment than both a rally and a fundraiser so the degree of payoff 
should be the least of the three types of visits. The only adaptation I make to the theory of 
time commitment by the president presented by Lang, Rottinghaus, and Peters is 
changing virtual visits to other visits. In so doing, I expect the lower time commitment to 
remain the same, also the lower degree of payoff.  
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Based on the theoretical expectation of time commitment by a president as a 
proxy for an electoral payoff for gubernatorial candidates, I argue the largest coefficient 
should be seen with rally visits. I argue that the next largest coefficient should be seen 
with fundraiser visits. Moreover, I argue that the smallest coefficient should be seen with 
other visits.  This signifies that I expect that different types of visits should have different 
impacts. Nevertheless, it seems that if the president chooses where to campaign 
strategically, then different types of partisan audiences should react differently to a visit 
from the president.  
Hypothesis 2: Different types of visits by the president should have varying 
impacts on a candidate’s midterm gubernatorial election. 
Hypothesis 2a: Rally visits should have the largest positive impact on a 
candidate’s midterm gubernatorial election. 
Hypothesis 2b: A fundraiser visit should be the second largest positive impact on 
a candidate’s midterm gubernatorial election. 
Hypothesis 2c: Other visits should be the smallest positive impact on a 
candidate’s midterm gubernatorial election. 
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DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
Data 
To test these hypotheses, I analyze all midterm elections between 1982 to the 
present. As not all states hold their gubernatorial elections in the midterm election cycle, 
typically 361 states held their elections with the exception of 2010 in which, there were 
372 elections held. Keeping this in mind, I operationalized each of my variables in the 
following ways: 
In previous scholarship, there are many ways to measure an impact. These 
different ways are important to discuss because different approaches could lead to 
differences in the findings across studies. Although impact can be measured in many 
ways, the focus of this thesis is using vote share as a measure of impact. For example, 
Peverill and Fastnow (1994) measure impact as a binary variable dependent upon if the 
president’s party wins the seat or not. Leyden and Borrelli (1995) measure impact as the 
percentage of two-party vote share of the party of the president. Nagel and McNulty 
(1996) use the measure of the percentage of total vote share of the party of the president 
for impact. However, Mellen and Searles (2013) look at the difference in the vote share 
                                                 
1
 The states hold elections their midterm gubernatorial elections in the midterm election cycle include 
Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, 
Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, Nevada, New 
Hampshire, New Mexico, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South 
Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Vermont, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. 
2
 The exception of 2010 is Utah, which held a special election in the midterm year to elect a new governor 
to fulfill the remainder of Governor Jon Huntsman Jr's term. This was following the appointment of 
Governor Huntsman to become United States Ambassador to China by President Obama. 
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between the president’s party and the non-president’s party as a measure of impact. 
Noting these measures and how visits have been measured allows for the use of 
scholarship to inform and structure the operationalization of the variables in this project. 
The dependent variable is the vote share of the candidate from the president’s 
party. This allows me to see if there is a positive or negative impact regardless of the 
outcome of an election. I operationalize this variable as the percentage of total vote share 
of the party of the president, similar to Nagel and McNulty (1996). I measure this 
variable by looking at the percentage of the total vote obtained by the candidate of the 
president's party. 
The main independent variables included in the model include types of visits by 
the president: 
Visits have been measured in various ways throughout the literature.  It is 
important to note the differences in how they have been measured because the differences 
in how visits have been measured may cause the differences in the findings across the 
various studies. When looking at presidential visits, Cohen et al. (1991) defines a visit as 
whether or not the president campaigned in the midterm senate election. Routh and 
Hoddie (2004) chose to use the number of presidential campaign visits to a state between 
August 1st and November’s Election Day. Eshbaugh-Soha and Nichlson-Crotty (2009) 
use the Cohen method, using a nominal level measure of whether or not a president 
campaigns in a state during a midterm election. Mellen and Searles (2013) measure the 
number of visits to a district in a midterm election year. The rest of literature seems to 
follow one of these methods on the measurements of a visit. 
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As discussed above, the concept of visits has been separated in some of the most 
recent literature. Measurement of visits when separating them out into different types of 
visits allows for further examination and further testing. For example, Sellers and Denton 
(2006) measure visits by how often the president visited one of the 50 states in the 
twenty-two-month period preceding each midterm election, but they broke it down into 
two categories, which are official, and campaign. Official visits are visits that are non-
campaign visits that are being used to strengthen his own electoral support in some states 
while campaign visits are visits being used to boost the candidate of the president’s party. 
Lang, Rottinghaus, and Peters (2011) use an even more in-depth visit structure. They 
count a specific type of visit made by the president in a state during the midterm election 
season, which is defined as August to the election. The types of visits defined by Lang, 
Rottinghaus, and Peters (2011) include rally, fundraiser, or virtual. Rally visits are an 
event where the president spoke to a crowd with the purpose of rallying supporters or 
encouraging citizens to vote. Fundraiser visits are visits where the president’s primary 
objective was to raise money for a candidate. Virtual campaigning is when the president 
did not physically visit a location but had a live or taped message for a group. 
A visit in this article is measured by the number of presidential visits to a state 
which there was mention of the gubernatorial candidate between August 1st and Election 
Day such as done by Routh and Hoddie (2004), plus the number of explicit campaign 
visits in the midterm election year prior to August as done by Mellen and Searles (2013). 
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I obtained this information by using data from The American Presidency Project3. First, 
there are “total” visits, which is the summation of all of the various types of visits.  
Based on the research done by Lang, Rottinghaus, and Peters (2011) it appears 
that there are three major types of visits by the president. Those types of visits are rally 
visits, fundraiser visits, and virtual, or what I will call other types of visits. First, as 
discussed by Lang, Rottinghaus, and Peters (2011), a “rally” is defined as an event where 
the president spoke to a crowd with the purpose of rallying supporters or encouraging 
citizens to vote. A “rally” was typically noted in the title of the president’s remarks for 
coding purposes. Second, as identified by Lang, Rottinghaus, and Peters (2011), a 
“fundraiser” is defined as a visit where the president’s primary objective was to raise 
money for a candidate. The president would often make formal remarks at such events 
and this type of event is often times connected to a breakfast, lunch, or dinner. Third, as 
identified by Lang, Rottinghaus, and Peters (2011), is what they call “virtual” 
campaigning, which I am going to call “other” visits. These “other” visits include things 
such as exchanges with reporters with the governor, interviews the president does for 
governors, official visits with the governor in attendance, official press releases about a 
governor from the office of a president, press briefings in which a governor is explicitly 
discussed, and satellite events. 
To mirror past studies, my model includes the following independent variables in 
my study as control variables that each has been found to impact elections: 
                                                 
3
 The types of visits that the  American Presidency project are candidate breakfast, candidate dinner, 
candidate fundraiser,  candidate lunch, candidate rally, candidate reception,  candidate lunch, committee 
breakfast, committee dinner, committee fundraiser, committee lunch, committee rally, committee reception, 
exchange with reporters/interviews, mention of candidates in attendance, as well as discussion of 
candidates  in press briefing, and satellite/virtual events. 
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Partisan Affiliation: Following the lead of Folke and Snyder (2012), partisan 
affiliation is the partisan division of seats in the state’s lower house. For my model, I 
specifically use the percentage of seats in the lower state house from the president’s 
party. I obtained this information from the University of Kentucky Center for Poverty 
Research (UKCPR) National Welfare Data. This seems particularly important to control 
for, as existing scholarship shows how partisanship is a determinate for a candidate’s 
electoral outcome. I expect that as the partisan affiliation of the president’s party 
increases the vote share of the candidate from the president’s party will increase. 
Unemployment rate: The model also includes the rate of unemployment at the 
state level.  I obtained this information from the UKCPR National Welfare Data, which 
uses the Bureau of Labor Statistics, Local Area Unemployment Statistics (LAUS) 
program. This seems particularly important to control for, as demonstrated to a 
significant factor in previous scholarship for example Bardwell (2005) who were able to 
show unemployment is a determinate of voting behaviors in gubernatorial elections. I 
expect that as the rate of unemployment increases the vote share of the candidate from 
the president’s party will decrease. 
Median income:  The model includes the median income at the state level. The 
median income data is in current dollars, which means the income included in the model 
for a person, household, or family adjusted for inflation. This data comes from the U.S. 
Census Bureau, Current Population Survey, Annual Social and Economic Supplements. 
This seems particularly important to control for, as Atkeson and Partin (1995) discovered 
governors, as state executives, are held accountable for perceived state economic 
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conditions. I expect that as the median income increases the vote share of the candidate 
from the president’s party will also increase. 
Won Electoral College votes in the Previous Election: The model includes a 
binary variable that is coded as a “1” if the president won Electoral College votes for that 
state the previous election while it is coded as a “0” if the president did not win Electoral 
College votes in the previous election4. This is important to control for, as it allows for 
controlling for states in which the president’s party should naturally do better. I expect 
that if the president won Electoral College votes in a state, the vote share of the candidate 
from the president’s party will be larger. 
Presidential approval: The model includes presidential approval data, which I 
obtained from Lang, Rottinghaus, and Peters (2011). They used the national approval of 
the president in September of the midterm election year, as registered by the Gallup Poll. 
This data I obtained from the question that they asked “Do you approve or disapprove of 
the way that president [insert name] is handling his job as president?” They cite their data 
as taken from Ragsdale (2007) and the Roper iPoll database. This seems particularly 
important to control for, as Simon (1989) was able to specifically demonstrate the 
relationship between a citizens' evaluation of the president and voting behaviors in 
gubernatorial elections. Based upon this finding, presidential approval becomes an 
important aspect of the modeling. I expect that as the presidential approval increases, the 
vote share of the candidate from the president’s party will also increase. 
                                                 
4
 There are only two states in which Electoral College votes are devisable within the same state these two 
states are Maine and Nebraska. However only once in the observed period are is a state’s electoral votes 
divided between two different candidates. This occurrence is in 2008 when President Obama won one of 
Nebraska’s five potential electoral votes. 
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Number of Years the president’s Party has controlled the White House: The 
model includes a variable that I coded for how many consecutive years the president’s 
party has held the Presidency. This seems particularly important to control for, as 
scholarship has shown a fatigue effect for the president’s party meaning the longer the 
president’s party controls the white house the greater the electoral losses his party tends 
to have in other elections. I expect that as the number of years the president’s party has 
controlled the white house increases, the vote share of the candidate from the president’s 
party will decrease. 
Table 1 Descriptive Statistics 
 
Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Min Max 
The Vote Share of the Gubernatorial 
Candidate from the president’s Party  
0.444 0.109 0 0.734 
Total Visits 1.182 1.925 0 11 
Rally Visits 0.191 0.485 0 3 
Fundraiser Visits 0.308 0.697 0 6 
Other Visits 0.683 1.331 0 9 
Partisanship  0.468 0.19 0 0.92 
Unemployment rate 6.164 2.269 2.3 15.6 
Median income  37677.37 13171.03 16464 76165 
Won State in the previous election 0.691 0.463 0 1 
Presidential Approval  50.778 10.283 38 65 
Number of Years President’s Party has 
held the White House  
4.667 2.67 2 10 
Observations  325    
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Table 1 shows each of the descriptive statistics for all of the variables described in 
the data section above. By examining these statistics, more context can be given to both 
my data and the results of my regressions. For example, my data analysis contains 325 
observations. This is important because it signifies the central limit theorem. 
In Table 1, each of the variables has its mean, standard deviation, min, and max. 
These statistics describe multiple things, for example when discussing total visits it has a 
mean of 1.182 meaning that out of all midterm gubernatorial elections, the president on 
average visits his candidate just a little over one time. However, because the minimum is 
zero it is seen that there are elections in which the president does not campaign for the 
candidate from his party. On the other hand, the maximum is 11 and thus it is seen that 
out of the nine observed elections cycles, the president has dedicated multiple visits to 
certain candidates, one of whom the president visited 11 times over the course of the 
observed election cycle. 
When looking at my dependent variable, the vote share of the gubernatorial 
candidate from the president’s party, there a couple of descriptive observations to note. 
The mean of vote share of the gubernatorial candidate from the president’s party is 0.444 
meaning that out of all midterm elections in the data set the average vote share of the 
gubernatorial candidate from the president’s party on average is 44.4 percent. The 
minimum is zero, and because the maximum is 0.734, that means that over the nine 
observed elections cycles the vote share of the gubernatorial candidate from the 
president’s party ranges from 0 percent to 73.4 percent. The standard deviation is 0.109 
or 10.9% of the vote share of the gubernatorial candidate from the president’s party. 
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This type of observation can also be made for the other main independent 
variables like other visits, which have a mean of 0.683 with a minimum of zero and a 
maximum of nine. This makes other visits the most common type of visit when they are 
separated out into types, which makes sense in conjunction with the theoretical 
expectation I would expect. This is based on the time commitment by the president as 
explained earlier. Because other visits have an even lower time commitment than both a 
rally and a fundraiser, it should be easier to employ these types of visits and thus they 
should be the most frequently seen type of visit. Next fundraiser visits have a mean of 
0.308 with a minimum of zero and a maximum of six, which once again makes sense in 
conjunction with the theoretical expectation I would expect.  
This is because of the time commitment by the president. Fundraisers may require 
less presidential time than rally visits but more than other visits so it should be expected 
to happen the second most following other visits which have the lowest time 
commitment. Then there are rally visits, which have a mean of 0.191 with a minimum of 
zero, and a maximum of three, which makes sense in conjunction with the theoretical 
expectation. This is because rally visits are the most time-consuming event for a president 
and as a result, these should probably be the fewest type of visit observed. Though in the 
regression analysis, they should have the highest degree of a payoff since rallies are the 
most publicly visible events and they maximize the public exposure of the president. 
Methodology 
With these variables, in order to test my hypotheses, I will employ two sets of 
models. The first set tests my first hypothesis while the second set tests the second 
hypothesis. In order to employ my models, the methodology I will use is first a cross-
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sectional regression specification, which allows for a simple ordinary least squares 
model. The use of the cross-sectional regression allows an examination of the existence 
and magnitude of the effects of visits on vote share regardless of time and place.  
A potential issue with the cross-sectional specifications that it could potentially 
suffer from omitted variable bias based on the amount of variation being explained by the 
variables in the model. 5  This demonstrates a need for further examination to ensure 
consistency and reliability in results of the regression. As it seems apparent that omitted 
variable bias is prevalent as the multiple regression is clearly missing relevant control 
variables. In addition, because these omitted factors are not adequately controlled for in 
the cross-sectional specification that could lead to endogeneity in the results. One of the 
ways to control for omitted variable bias and to ensure there is not endogeneity is to use a 
panel model. Thus, I will employ a panel regression specification in order to help control 
for omitted variable bias.6 By employing both specifications, the results can be examined 
                                                 
5 The cross-sectional regression specification models are defined as the following: 
 
Model 1: 
Yi = β0 + β1·TVi + β2·PAi + β3·IVPAi + β4·UnRi + β5·MIi + β6·ECi + β7·PAi + β8·PPi + ℮ 
 
Model 2: 
Yi = β0 + β1·RVi + β2·FVi + β3·OVi + β4·PAi + β3·IVPAi + β5·UnRi + β6·MIi + β7·ECi + β8·PAi + 
β9·PPi + ℮ 
 
where Y represents vote share of the gubernatorial candidate from the president’s party, TV represents 
“Total” Visits, RV represents “Rally” Visits, FV represents “Fundraiser” Visits, OV represents “Other” 
Visits, PA represents Partisan Affiliation, IVPA represents an Interaction between Visits and Partisan 
Affiliation which is conceptualized by multiplying a type of visit with the partisan affiliation measure, UnR 
represents Unemployment Rate, MI represents Median Income, EC represents Won Electoral College votes 
in Previous Election, PA represents presidential Approval, and PP represents Years the president’s Party 
has controlled the White House. 
6 The panel regression specification models with fixed effects are defined as: 
 
Model 1: 
Yi = β0 + β1·TVit + β2·PAit + β3·IVPAit + β4·UnRit + β5·MIit + β6·ECit + β7·PAit + β8·PPit + ℮ 
 
Model 2: 
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for consistency both in terms of statistical and economic significance. A panel regression 
specification allows the data as a whole to be used without omitting time and place, 
which allows for the creation of a baseline to see how visits effect the expectation vs. the 
actual vote share. Thus, the data set is a panel data set when the panel variable is set to 
the state and the time variable is set to the year of the election, which allows for the use 
of a panel regression.  
This regression type also offers other advantages over the cross-sectional 
regression such as being able to control for effects between units, in this case, states, 
and/or effects between time points, in this case, different years. As discussed by Lang, 
Rottinghaus, and Peters (2011), the proper type of panel regression model to use in this 
case is fixed effects as this type of panel regression model allows for the creation of 
parameters, in this case, individual states, and is appropriate because it appears there are 
effects of the individual state characteristics that could be related. Thus, fixed-effects and 
not a random effects model is employed as it examines state-level variables that may be 
correlated to vote share. Another reason for the use of a fixed effects model is the 
theoretical belief that the results are not subject to random variation and that they do not 
vary across time.  
                                                                                                                                                 
Yi = β0 + β1·RVit + β2·FVit + β3·OVit + β4·PAit + β5·IVPAit + β6·UnRit + β7·MIit + β8·ECit + β9·PAit 
+ β10·PPit + ℮ 
 
where Y represents: The vote share of the gubernatorial candidate from the president’s party, TV represents 
“Total” Visits, RV represents “Rally” Visits, FV represents “Fundraiser” Visits, OV represents “Other” 
Visits, PA represents Partisan Affiliation, IVPA represents an Interaction between Visits and Partisan 
Affiliation which is conceptualized by multiplying a type of visit with the partisan affiliation measure, UnR 
represents Unemployment Rate, MI represents Median Income, EC represents Won Electoral College votes 
in Previous Election, PA represents presidential Approval, and PP represents Years the president’s Party 
has controlled the White House. 
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Also, I believe that it could be important to include in my model an interaction 
between visits and partisanship to further enhance the understanding of the impact of a 
visit. By adding this interaction with partisanship, I will able to see what the impact of a 
visit will be at varying levels of partisanship, which I measure as the percentage of seats 
in the lower state house from the president’s party. Based on this analysis I will see in 
which states visits are more effective. Also, I will see what the expected impact of a visit 
will be at any level of partisanship. For example, this analysis could demonstrate the 
effects of a visit at lower levels of partisanship in the president’s party: perhaps the visits 
effect on the vote share of the candidate from their party at this level is negative. Perhaps 
if there are higher levels of partisanship of the president’s party the effect of a visit on the 
vote share of the candidate from their party is nonexistent. These findings will further 
demonstrate the impact of a visit and how a president can maximize the effect of a visit 
and the impact for their candidate. 
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RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Results 
In order to view the impact of presidential visits, my results section will proceed 
in two parts. First, I examine to what extent a visit by the president changes the vote 
share of a candidate from their party leads in Table 2.  Second, when distinguishing 
among types of visits, an examination of Table 3 demonstrates what types of visits by the 
president do impact a candidate from his party. This two-stage approach allows us to first 
understand how presidential visits matter in Table 2. Table 3 then builds upon this 
understanding by distinguishing among types of visits to see what types of visits matter 
and which do not. After a discussion of which results in these tables are significant, I then 
turn to an interpretation of the results. I will then discuss the findings and why control 
variables may or may not be significant and explanatory factors, and how this might 
depend on the employed model specification. 
Table 2 presents the results of my empirical analysis when the main independent 
variable is total visits or when I summed all campaign visit activity together. Table 2 is a 
summary table of the impact of total visits on the vote share of the gubernatorial 
candidate from the president’s party. Although each column is similar, some differences 
are important to note in order to allow for a more comprehensive understanding of the 
consistency and validity of the findings. Thus, each of the columns represented by a 
different model specification will be discussed. 
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Table 2 Summary Table of Impact of Total Visits 
Dependent Variable: The Vote Share of the Gubernatorial Candidate from the president’s 
Party 
 Cross-
Sectional 
Cross-Sectional with 
total visits Interaction 
Panel with total visits 
Interaction 
 Constant 0.383*** 
(0.06) 
0.361*** 
    (0 
.062) 
0.284*** 
(0.064) 
 Total Visits 0.004** 
(0.002) 
0.023*** 
(0.009) 
0.021*** 
(0.007) 
Partisanship  0.024 
(0.037) 
0.059* 
(0.044) 
0.1*** 
(0.042) 
(Total Visits)*( Partisanship)  -0.0382*** 
(0.0159) 
-0.038*** 
(0.013) 
Unemployment rate -0.005* 
(0.0032) 
-0.004* 
(0.003) 
0.001 
(0.004) 
Median income  3.68E-07 
(5.37E-07) 
4.37e-07 
(5.35e-07) 
6.78E-07* 
(5.30E-07) 
Won State in the previous election 0.035*** 
(0.015) 
0.035** 
(0.015) 
0.03** 
(0.014) 
Presidential Approval  0.001** 
(0.001) 
.001** 
(0.001) 
0.002*** 
(0.001) 
Number of Years President’s 
Party has held the White House  
-0.005** 
(0.003) 
-0.005** 
(0.003) 
-0.003 
(0.003) 
Observations 325 325 325 
State-by-Year Fixed Effects Panel 
Analysis  
No No Yes 
Prob > F 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.002*** 
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R2 0.061 0.071 0.079 
Notes: The dependent variable is vote share of the gubernatorial candidate from the 
president’s party, which is the percentage of total vote share obtained by the candidate of 
the party of the president. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
*** indicates statistical significance at p < .01  
** indicates statistical significance at p < .05 
* indicates statistical significance at p < .10 
The first column uses the cross-sectional model with all campaign visit activity 
summed together. The results of this model show that a total visit is a significant factor. 
Along with total visits, significant variables in the specification include the 
unemployment rate, whether a president won a state in the previous election, presidential 
approval, and the number of years the president’s party has held the White House. This 
means that each of these variables is a predictive factor of vote share. Along with what is 
significant, it is also important to note what is found to not be significant, such as 
partisanship, and median income. This tells us that in this specification the things that 
affect the vote share of a gubernatorial candidate from the president’s party include visits 
by the president, unemployment rate, whether a president won a state in the previous 
election, presidential approval, and the number of years the president’s party has held the 
White House. This demonstrates that there could be a statistical method to predict and 
potentially influence the vote share of those candidates. From this, we can infer that 
certain factors influence the voting behaviors of the electorate more than others do. For 
example, it is seen that the unemployment rate (-.005) has an influence five times greater 
on vote share than presidential approval (.001). This means a one unit change in the 
presidential approval causes a smaller effect than a one unit change in unemployment 
rate. 
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In the second column, there is a cross-sectional model with the interaction term 
when all campaign visits are summed together. The results of this model show that total 
visits are once again a significant factor. Along with total visits, other things in this 
model that are found to be significant include partisanship, the interaction term, 
unemployment rate, won state in the previous election, presidential approval, and the 
number of years the president’s party has held the White House. Along with what is 
significant, it is also important to note what is not found to be significant. In this model, it 
is seen that once again median income is found to not be significant. This tells us that 
when adding the interaction between visits and partisanship that while the significance of 
visits remains constant, a new factor gains significance. This factor is partisanship, which 
is part of the interaction, which appears too significant as a whole.  
In the third column, impact of total visits on the vote share of the gubernatorial 
candidate from the president’s party, the panel model with fixed effect that includes the 
interaction term when all campaign visits are summed together. The results demonstrate 
that total visits are once again significant. Along with total visits, other significant 
variables include partisanship, the interaction term, median income, won a state in the 
previous election, presidential approval, and the number of years the president’s party has 
held the White House.  
Along with what is significant, it is also important to note what is found to not be 
significant, which in this model is found to be only unemployment rate. This tells us that 
when the interaction remains constant and when the panel specification is used instead of 
the cross-sectional specification, visits are still significant. However, it demonstrates that 
while employing this specification the other factors that contribute to vote share differ as 
34 
 
the unemployment rate and the number of years the president’s party has held the White 
House are not significant while median income does matter.  
Table 2 tells us that a presidential visit provides a vote share boost for the 
candidate that they campaign for. These results support my first hypothesis as well my 
expectations for the control variables. Other factors differ depending on the model 
specification but each factor is significant in at least one specification. This variation in 
the significance of control variables could potentially be a weakness of the utilized data 
when the panel specification is employed, which I will discuss in further detail in the 
discussion section. However, in order to determine whether my second hypothesis and 
expectations of the control variables are correct, I need to examine the results in Table 3 
to see if different types of visits have different expectations. 
Table 3 presents the results of my empirical analysis when distinguishing between 
the different types of visits. The results demonstrate that different types of visits are 
associated with variation in vote share. Table 3 also presents a summary of the impacts of 
different visits on the vote share of the gubernatorial candidate from the president’s party. 
Although each column is similar, some differences are important to note in order to allow 
for a more comprehensive understanding of the consistency and validity of the findings. 
Thus, each of the columns represented by a different model specification will be 
discussed. 
The first column uses a cross-sectional model with all campaign visits split out 
into rally, fundraiser, and other visits. When running this model, rally is the only type of 
visit that is significant while fundraiser and other visits are found to be not significant. 
Along with rally visits, other variables in this model that are found to be significant 
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include unemployment rate, won state in the previous election, presidential approval, and 
the number of years the president’s party has held the White House. These results allow 
for a good baseline model specification upon which the other model specifications can be 
compared to see how those differences can be explained by both the data and the 
analytical approach.  
Table 3 Summary Table of Impact of Split Visits 
Dependent Variable: The Vote Share of the Gubernatorial Candidate from the president’s 
Party 
  
 
Cross-
Sectional 
 
 
 
Panel  
 
Panel with 
rally visits 
Interaction 
Panel with 
fundraiser 
visits 
Interaction  
 
Panel with 
other visits 
Interaction  
 Constant 0.381*** 
(0.06) 
0.305*** 
(0.058) 
0.293*** 
(0.062) 
0.295 
(0.061) 
0.292*** 
(0.06) 
 Rally Visits 0.014* 
(0.011) 
0.016* 
(0.012) 
0.066*** 
(0.022) 
0.018* 
(0.012) 
0.016* 
(0.012) 
 Fundraiser Visits 0.008 
(0.009) 
-0.0003 
(0.011) 
-9.82e-06 
(0.011) 
0.036 
(0.037) 
-0.002 
(0.011) 
 Other Visits 0.001 
(0.004) 
-0.001 
(0.005) 
-.0002 
(0.005) 
0.00002 
(0.005) 
0.019** 
(0.009) 
Partisanship  0.026 
(0.037) 
0.067** 
(0.035) 
.082** 
(0.037) 
0.076** 
(0.037) 
0.089** 
(0.04) 
(Rally Visits)*(Partisanship) 
  
-0.11** 
(0.049) 
  
(Fundraiser 
Visits)*(Partisanship)    
-0.086* 
(0.077) 
 
(Other Visits)*(Partisanship) 
    
-0.037** 
(0.015) 
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Unemployment rate -0.005* 
(0.003) 
-0.0004 
(0.004) 
0.0001** 
(0.005) 
-0.0004 
(0.004) 
0.0001 
(0.004) 
Median income  
3.60E-07 
(5.39E-07) 
5.71E-07 
(5.36E-
07) 
6.87e-
07*** 
(5.51e-07) 
6.28e-07 
(5.42e-07) 
5.49E-07 
(5.24E-07) 
Won State in previous election 0.034*** 
(0.014) 
0.028** 
(0.014) 
0.026 
(0.014) 
0.027** 
(0.014) 
0.027** 
(0.014) 
Presidential Approval  0.001** 
(0.000665) 
0.002** 
(0.001) 
0.002*** 
(0.0006) 
0.002*** 
(0.001) 
0.002*** 
(0.001) 
Number of Years President’s 
Party has held the White House 
-0.005** 
(0.003) 
-0.003 
(0.003) 
-0.003 
(0.003) 
-0.004 
(0.003) 
-0.003 
(0.003) 
Observations 325 325 325 325 325 
State-by-Year Fixed Effects 
Panel Analysis 
No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Prob > F 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.000*** 
R2 0.064 .072 0.081 0.077 0.077 
Notes: The dependent variable is vote share of the gubernatorial candidate from the 
president’s party, which is the percentage of total vote share obtained by the candidate of 
the party of the president. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
*** indicates statistical significance at p < .01  
** indicates statistical significance at p < .05 
* indicates statistical significance at p < .10 
In the second column of Table 3, the impact of split visits on the vote share of the 
gubernatorial candidate from the president’s party, the panel model with fixed effects 
includes all campaign visits split out into the rally, fundraiser, and other visits. When 
running this model, rally is the only type of visit that is found to be significant while 
fundraiser and other visits are found to be insignificant. Along with rally visits, other 
variables in this model that are significant include partisanship, won state in the previous 
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election, and presidential approval. The variables found in this model to be insignificant 
include the unemployment rate, the number of years the president’s party has held the 
White House, and median income. However, when the panel specification is employed, 
the unemployment rate and the number of years the president’s party has held the White 
House are not significant, while partisanship is significant. From which we can really 
infer from this model is that when looking at rally visits are consistently significant and 
positive while the other types of visits are consistently not significantly. 
In the third column of Table 3, the impact of total visits on the vote share of the 
gubernatorial candidate from the president’s party, are the results from the panel model 
with fixed effects, which includes all campaign visits split out as well as an interaction 
term that uses rally visits with partisanship. When running this model, the rally 
partisanship interaction is significant as demonstrated in figure 3. However, fundraiser 
and other visits are found to be not significant. Along with rally visits, other variables in 
this model that are found to be significant include the unemployment rate, median 
income, presidential approval, and the number of years the president’s party has held the 
White House. The only control variable that is not significant is whether the president 
won the state in the previous election. This tells us that rally visits seem to have a strong 
interaction with partisanship. From the results, it is also seen that the control variables 
also matter more when controlling for the interaction between rally visits and 
partisanship.  
However, the fourth and fifth columns in Table 3, appear to be similar. Each 
column represents the impact of split visits on the vote share of the gubernatorial 
candidate from the president’s party, both with panel models with fixed effects which 
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includes all campaign visits split out and includes an interaction between fundraiser visits 
(in the fourth column) or other visits (in the fifth column) and partisanship.  In the fourth 
column, the interaction between the fundraiser visits and partisanship is significant as 
demonstrated in figure 4. Then in the fifth column, it is seen that the interaction between 
the other visits  and partisanship is not significant. However, the control variables that are 
found to be significant in both of these model specifications include partisanship, the 
interaction term, won state in the previous election, and presidential approval. The 
variables found to not be significant include unemployment rate, median income, and the 
number of years the president’s party has held the White House. From these models, we 
can infer that rally visits are significant not only in these two models but also over the 
course of all five models. With that being said, over the course of these models, there is 
consistency in the control variables, which heavily relate to the specification in column 
two. 
Discussion 
The estimates for the models displayed above in Tables 2 and 3 present numerous 
findings that are worth identifying. Table 2 presents analyses for the findings related to 
elections using total visits while the analyses for the findings for elections when 
distinguishing among types of visits is in Table 3. In general, this research suggests there 
can be a vote share boost from a presidential visit that is real and can affect the outcome 
of elections. Based on the data analysis, the findings include that visits generally have a 
positive impact on vote share. In fact, visits by presidents help the candidates of their 
parties by increasing the vote share that the candidates of the president’s party receive 
which improves their opportunity for both election and reelection. This demonstrates that 
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when a president strategically decides when, where and for whom to campaign for, their 
efforts do in fact pay off which demonstrates external validity to the findings of Cohen et 
al. However, once an interaction term is introduced to see the relationship between visits 
and partisanship, the impact of a visit in terms of both its significance and its magnitude 
is seen to be dependent upon the partisan makeup of a state. Third, I find that other 
control variables have unique and differing impacts on a candidates’ vote share. 
Focusing on the total visits models, it is clear that certain determinates are 
consistently significant which demonstrates that there are certain factors that are more 
important than other factors.  Table 2 shows determinates of the vote share of the 
gubernatorial candidate from the president’s party. First, when focusing on total visits or 
the summation, of all the different types of visits, in all three of the model specifications, 
visits are always significant and consistently positive when not accounting for the 
interaction term. The nature of the positive relationship tells us that there is a direct 
relationship between visits and vote share, which was the expected relationship based on 
my hypothesis and theory. This signifies an important finding that candidates of the 
president’s party that receive visits from the president do receive a higher percentage of 
vote share than they would have if they had they not received a visit by the president. 
This means that candidates that receive a visit from the president are more likely to be 
elected than those who do not receive a visit. 
When interpreting the coefficient based on an examination of the coefficient of 
total visits in the cross-sectional model column, when there is a visit by a president to a 
gubernatorial candidate, the expected percentage of the vote share received by that 
gubernatorial candidate is predicted to increase by 0.4%. The finding that the average 
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visit improves a candidate’s vote share by around nearly 0.4%. percentage points on 
average is important because it suggests that this vote share boost from a presidential visit 
is real and can affect the outcome of elections if enough attention is paid by a candidate. 
In application, when looking at just the close gubernatorial election states from the 2014-
midterm elections and focusing only on the 11 states that President Obama won in the 
preceding general election; the Democratic Party’s candidate only won four elections.7 
Based upon the estimated 0.4 percent increase in vote share that the president can bring 
with a visit, there are at least two elections in which the president could have potentially 
flipped the election. These states are Florida and Massachusetts in which there were no 
visits by the president, rather candidates in those states distanced themselves from the 
president. If there had been just a few visits, the president to either candidate could have 
changed the outcome of the election and there could have been a Democrat elected 
instead of a Republican. This finding would provide evidence for my first hypothesis. 
                                                 
7 These states are Colorado, Connecticut, New Hampshire, and Rhode Island. 
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Figure 2 Total Visits and Partisanship Interaction 
This picture changes when the model includes an interaction term between total 
visits and partisanship, the picture changes as demonstrated in Figure 2. At lower levels 
of partisanship of the president’s party: total visits effect on the vote share of the 
candidate from their party is about two percent of additional vote share per visit. 
However, when the levels of partisanship of the president’s party increase to about .55: 
total visits effect on the vote share of the candidate from their party is indistinguishable 
from zero. Furthermore, when the levels of partisanship of the president’s party increase 
past .75: total visits effect on the vote share of the candidate from their party is, in fact, 
negative. This finding is both interesting and important that when accounting for the 
relationship between visits and partisanship, the impact is contingent upon the partisan 
makeup of a state.  
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Rally visits, like total visits, when not accounting for the interaction between 
visits and partisanship are consistently significant and positive. The positive coefficient 
tells us that there is a direct relationship between rally visits and vote share, which was 
the expected relationship based on my hypothesis and theory. This demonstrates that 
candidates of the president’s party that receive rally visits from the president receive a 
higher percentage of vote share than they would have if they had not received a visit from 
the president. The coefficient of rally visits in my cross-sectional column signifies that 
when there is a rally visit by a president to a gubernatorial candidate, the expected 
percentage of the vote share received by that gubernatorial candidate is predicted to 
increase by 1.4%. In my panel model, the coefficient signifies that when there is a visit 
by a president to a gubernatorial candidate, the expected percentage of the vote share 
received by that gubernatorial candidate is predicted to increase by 1.6%. While in the 
panel model with the fundraiser visits and partisanship interaction, the coefficient 
signifies that when there is a visit by a president to a gubernatorial candidate, the 
expected percentage of the vote share received by that gubernatorial candidate is 
predicted to increase by 1.8%. Although in the panel model with the other visits and 
partisanship interaction, the slope coefficient is 0.016, which signifies that when there is a 
visit by a president to a gubernatorial candidate, the expected percentage of the vote share 
received by that gubernatorial candidate is predicted to increase by 1.6%. This difference 
in vote share from a presidential visit has the ability to affect the outcome of close 
elections. 
Thus, the type of visit matters when distinguishing between types of visits. I find 
that in terms of increasing vote share when distinguishing between types of visits that 
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rally visits are the best. Although other visits do matter, when the interaction term is 
introduced, it shows that rally visits are consistently significant and consistently help 
candidates of the president’s party. This finding of rally visits improving a candidate’s 
vote share by around one and a half percentage points on average is another important 
discovery. When observing those same close gubernatorial elections from the 2014 
midterm elections and focusing only on the states that President Obama won in the 
preceding general election, there were eleven states to focus on. 8  Based upon the 
estimated one and a half percentage point increase in the vote share that the president can 
bring with a rally visit, only one seat is flipped, and that state is Florida. While multiple 
rally visits could have potentially changed the outcome for multiple states.  
 
Figure 3 Rally Visits and Partisanship Interaction 
                                                 
8 These states are Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Illinois, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, 
New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Wisconsin. 
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However, once again the picture differs when the interaction term between rally 
visits and partisanship interaction is introduced in column 3 as seen in Figure 3. At lower 
levels of partisanship of the president’s party: rally visits effect on the vote share of the 
candidate from their party is about seven percent of additional vote share per visit. 
Although, when the levels of partisanship of the president’s party increase to about .45: 
rally visits effect on the vote share of the candidate from their party is indistinguishable 
from zero. Furthermore, when the levels of partisanship of the president’s party increase 
past .73: rally visits effect on the vote share of the candidate from their party is, in fact, 
negative. This, like total visit, is both interesting and important when accounting for the 
relationship between visits and partisanship impact is contingent upon the partisan 
makeup of a state.  
 
Figure 4 Fundraisers Visits and Partisanship Interaction 
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When distinguishing between the types of visits, some of the findings I expected 
while others I did not. For example, fundraiser visits were consistently not significant. 
However, this demonstrates that different types of visits have different impacts like those 
that I expected. However, as seen in Figure 4, there is some significance for fundraisers 
when the interaction term is introduced to the model specification between fundraiser 
visits and partisanship. At lower levels of partisanship of the president’s party: 
fundraisers visits effect on the vote share of the candidate from their party is about 4.5 
percent of additional vote share per visit. Although, when the levels of partisanship of the 
president’s party increase to .35: rally visits effect on the vote share of the candidate from 
their party is indistinguishable from zero and remains so. This is interesting and 
important as there appears to be a lack of significance overall for fundraiser visits. 
However, when accounting for the interaction between visits and partisanship, the impact 
is contingent upon the partisan makeup of a state where there is slight significance when 
the partisan makeup is below .35.  
However different from the previous three interaction visit specifications, other 
visits were not statistically significance in any of the model specifications; this once 
again demonstrates that different types of visits have different impacts.  These results are 
consistent with the five model specifications. This lack of significance in all of the 
models including the model where the interaction term shows a finding of consistency. 
This finding could be demonstrating that there is a lack of consistency in the 
categorization of what is another visit. This is seen at all levels of partisanship of the 
president’s party: rally visits effect on the vote share of the candidate from their party is 
indistinguishable from zero. This finding of non-significance is large as the results 
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indicate that in terms of final vote share, other visits have no impact. This means that 
there is no difference on vote share whether this visit by the president occurs. 
When looking at other determinates of vote share in the total visits model 
specifications found in Table 2 there are two factors I find are consistently significant in 
all of the models in which they are included. First, whether the president won Electoral 
College votes in the previous election. Second, I find that the national approval of the 
president in September of the midterm election year is consistently significant. The 
approval being significant is an interesting finding because Eshbaugh-Soha et al. and 
Lang et al. find that approval is not a significant factor while observing the strategic 
motivations of a president. They surmise that perhaps this is because national popularity 
may not drive local visiting trends. While national popularity may not drive local visiting 
trends, it does, in fact, affect the vote share as originally demonstrated by Simon. This 
seems to demonstrate the common finding that midterm gubernatorial elections have 
some sort of referenda effect on the party of the president.  
Other predictors of vote share that are somewhat consistently significant in the 
models, meaning they are significant in two of the three models, including first 
partisanship. Another variable that is significant is unemployment rate, which has 
significance in two of the three models. Perhaps it is not significant in the panel model 
because there is not enough variation in these types of variables such as national 
unemployment rate when controlling for the state. Then the number of years the 
president’s party held the White House is significant in two-thirds of the models. Perhaps 
this is a similar explanation as the variables that are constant over an election cycle do not 
allow for enough variation once controlling for the state. Only one predictor is found to 
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be slightly significant, meaning that it is only significant in one of the three models. That 
predictor is median income, which is only found to be significant in the models that 
control for the state, perhaps demonstrating that the variation between states is only seen 
once the state is controlled for. Overall, these findings are consistent with previous 
research as well as the expected relationships discussed in my data section. 
Other determinates of vote share that are found to be significant in Table 3 when 
distinguishing between types include two multiple factors. The first factor I find is 
significant is the national approval of the president in September of the midterm election 
year. Other predictors of vote share that are found to be somewhat consistently significant 
meaning that they are significant in at least three of the five models include another two 
factors. The first of these determinates is partisanship. The second of these determinates 
is if the president won Electoral College votes in the previous election. However, three 
determinants are found to be only slightly significant meaning they are only significant in 
between one and three of the model specifications. The first of those factors with slight 
significance is unemployment rate. The unemployment rate is significant in two of the 
five specifications. What is even more interesting is that one of the two results actually 
has a coefficient that was positive as opposed to the expected negative coefficient. A 
reason for this might be the same as discussed above for the total visit models in which 
the data used as is a national level indicator, thus it may not have enough variation once 
controlling for the location to show significance. The second of the three determinates 
with slight significance is median income which is only significant in one of the five 
specifications. Then finally, the numbers of years the president’s party has held the White 
House only has slight significance in two of the five model specifications perhaps for 
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similar reasons to the unemployment rate. For the most part, these are consistent with the 
findings from other studies and in accordance with the expected relationship as discussed 
above. 
My research suggests that this vote share boost from a presidential visit is real and 
can affect the outcome of close elections. However, it is also clear that the effectiveness 
and the nature of an impact is based on the partisan composition of a state.  Also based on 
my findings it appears that a candidate may not win, but without presidential visits, 
candidates could have ended up with a lower amount of vote share, in fact losing worse 
than the final result. This finding is significant as it shows external validity for the work 
of Cohen et al. However, there is a large caveat in this finding that vote share is boosted 
by presidential visits. The stipulation of my findings is that the impact of a visit is 
dependent on the strategic calculation component discussed in previous research.  While 
the states I discuss in regards to the 2014 election are only competitive states that the 
president had previously won. This is because they are closest to being flipped in terms of 
vote share. However, as seen in my discussion above the largest potential impact a 
president such as President Obama could have is in a state such as Kansas or Wyoming as 
the impact would not be the same. This is contrary to conventional wisdom that surmises 
that those types of visits would have a negative impact. However, as demonstrated above 
that is incorrect. Moreover, this is not to say that Kansas or Wyoming would be flipped 
from red to blue it would just make the margin of victory for the winning party smaller. 
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CONCLUSION 
Presidential visits can have a significant and positive relationship on midterm 
gubernatorial elections. The change in vote share seems to occur because presidential 
visits help gubernatorial candidates reestablish enthusiasm among their key 
constituencies. This means presidential visits increase the vote share of midterm 
gubernatorial candidates of his party. This finding demonstrates that the work of Cohen et 
al. has external validity, as their finding related to Senate elections is applicable to 
gubernatorial elections. My findings support my second hypothesis that different types of 
presidential visits in fact have different impacts on candidates. However, when looking at 
the interaction between visits and partisanship, the impact of visits is seen to be 
dependent upon on the partisan composition of a state. I further demonstrate that rally 
visits have a consistently significant and typically positive impact on midterm 
gubernatorial elections, although the interacting term shows some variation in the impact. 
My work also shows that fundraiser visits have a less significant and a much more 
limited effect on midterm gubernatorial elections. My work further demonstrates that 
different types of visits do in fact have varying impacts on candidates as it shows that 
other visits have no significance and no effect on midterm gubernatorial elections. 
This thesis has multiple contributions to presidential scholarship.  The impact of 
visits by the president on midterm gubernatorial elections is consistently positive for the 
candidates of the president’s party meaning that visits improve the vote share obtained by 
those candidates while not using any interactions. However, I demonstrate the importance 
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of considering the partisan nature of a state when determining the expected impact of a 
visit to the state. This is not only a significant contribution to scholarship but it is also a 
significant contribution to campaign management. This is because it demonstrates that 
campaigns under the circumstances outlined by the study of the strategic calculation 
should want the sitting president to come campaign for their candidate. In addition, 
presidents should be able to campaign knowing that their efforts have a positive impact 
on the vote share of those candidates they strategically select.  
Based on the findings and contributions of my thesis, there are a few different 
implications that could be discussed.  Out of all of these implications, perhaps the most 
interesting is based on a finding of slight significance and non-significance. This is seen 
as out of all the visit types, the one type that seems to have very slim significance as it is 
only partially significant in one of the five models is fundraiser visits. However, perhaps 
there is an actual explanation for why fundraiser visits only have this level of 
significance. Remembering that the dependent variable in the analysis is the vote share of 
the candidate from the president’s party, fundraisers do not have a direct impact and 
while this is not the purpose of this paper, perhaps there is a simple theory to demonstrate 
why this might, in fact, be the case. This potential theory is perhaps best illustrated by an 
example involving President Obama and former Illinois Governor Quinn. In leading up to 
the 2014 midterm elections, President Obama held a fundraiser on the behalf of Governor 
Quinn. There was in total 25 attendees each paying $50,000 to attend the event. Perhaps 
it is not such a surprise that there is not a direct effect on vote share as a fundraiser has 
thousands of people less in attendance than a rally, and perhaps the direct purpose of a 
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fundraiser visit is not to effect vote share. This different purpose of fundraiser visits and 
their impact on elections could be looked at in further research.   
Other implications of my thesis seem to further illustrate other aspects of 
scholarship. For example, Cohen et al. found that visits have a positive impact for Senate 
candidates, and I was able to find that visits have without the interaction also have a 
positive impact on gubernatorial candidates. The implication of this finding is that 
perhaps elections are very closely related. This could be particularly true as the same 
constituencies elect both Senators and Governors, and often at the same time. This is an 
idea that has been examined in previous literature related to the different determinates of 
gubernatorial elections. Another implication as previously discussed is that different 
types of visits have different types of impacts, for example, fundraisers have a slight 
statistical impact. Based upon this, perhaps presidents need to focus more on rally visits 
in the future for candidates than any other types of visits.  
A different, yet important set of implications based on the findings and 
contributions of this research is that it has demonstrated future directions of research. One 
example of what future research could look at is the different ways of separating out 
types of visits. This could be done by looking at a division between candidate-centered 
visits and committee-centered visits to see if there is any different effect on vote share for 
an individual candidate when there is more than one candidate in attendance. Another 
direction of future research could potentially be to look at one of the other different 
definitions of visits to see if the results remain constant.  
Finally, among many other things, future research could potentially look at other 
types of measures of impacts as I only looked at the final vote share of the candidate from 
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the president’s party. One way impact could be measured is taking into account both 
actual vote in the election and the average performance in that election over several 
previous elections. This allows for an estimate of how well the party did in the states the 
president visited relative to how it should do. In so doing, the difference between the 
actual vote and the expected vote would be the impact of the visit by the president while 
controlling for other factors. Other types of measures of impacts could include a binary 
variable for a win or a loss for the candidate of the president’s party. Another variable 
that could be looked at is fundraising numbers for candidates. Another direction of future 
research could be looking at poll numbers and using them to try to measure the impact of 
a visit. Another thing that future research should look at is if the casual mechanism to 
whether the president does, in fact, increase turnout for candidates that they visit. This 
line of inquiry is even more necessary in determining the causal mechanism as I find that 
partisanship affects the type of impact that a visit has even leading a president to 
potentially having a negative impact on the gubernatorial candidate from their party. 
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